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Abstract. Until is a notoriously difficult temporal operator as it is both
existential and universal at the same time: AUB holds at the current
time instant w iff either B holds at w or there exists a time instant
w′ in the future at which B holds and such that A holds in all the
time instants between the current one and w′. This “ambivalent” nature
poses a significant challenge when attempting to give deduction rules for
until. In this paper, in contrast, we make explicit this duality of until by
introducing a new temporal operator ∇ that allows us to formalize the
“history” of until, i.e., the “internal” universal quantification over the
time instants between the current one and w′. This approach provides
the basis for formalizing deduction systems for temporal logics endowed
with the until operator. For concreteness, we give here a labeled natural
deduction system for a linear-time logic endowed with the new history
operator and show that, via a proper translation, such a system is also
sound and complete with respect to the linear temporal logic LTL with
until.
1 Introduction
Until is a notoriously difficult temporal operator. This is because of its “am-
bivalent” nature of being an operator that is both existential and universal at
the same time: AUB holds at the current time instant (sometimes “world” or
“state” is used in place of “time instant”) w iff either B holds at w or there
exists a time instant w′ in the future at which B holds and such that A holds
in all the time instants between the current one and w′. The words in emphasis
highlight the dual existential and universal nature of U, which poses a significant
challenge when attempting to give deduction rules for until, so that deduction
systems for temporal logics either deliberately exclude until from the set of op-
erators considered or devise clever ways to formalize reasoning about until. And
even if one manages to give rules, these often come at the price of additional
difficulties for, or even the impossibility of, proving useful metatheoretic proper-
ties, such as normalization or the subformula property. (This is even more so in
the case of Hilbert-style axiomatizations, which provide axioms for until, but are
not easily usable for proof construction.) See, for instance, [1,2,7,12,13,20], where
techniques for formalizing suitable inference rules include introducing additional
information (such as the use of a Skolem function f(AUB) to name the time
instant where B begins to hold), or exploiting the standard recursive unfolding
of until
AUB ≡ B ∨ (A ∧ X(AUB)) (1)
which says that AUB iff either B holds or A holds and in the successor time
instant (as expressed by the next operator X) we have again AUB.
In this paper, in contrast, we make explicit the duality of until by introducing
a new temporal operator ∇ that allows us to formalize the “history” of until,
i.e., the fact that when we have AUB the formula A holds in all the time instants
between the current one and the one where B holds. We express this “historic”
universal quantification by means of ∇ with respect to the following intuitive
translation:
AUB ≡ B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A) (2)
That is: AUB iff either B holds or there exists a time instant w′ in the future
(as expressed by the sometime in the future operator F) such that
– B holds in the successor time instant, and
– A holds in all the time instants between the current one and w′ (included).
The latter conjunct is precisely what the history operator ∇ expresses1. This is
better seen when introducing labeling: since ∇ actually quantifies over the time
instants in an interval (delimited by the current instant and the one where the
B of the until holds), we adopt a labeling discipline that is slightly different from
the more customary one of labeled deduction.
The framework of labeled deduction has been successfully employed for several
non-classical, and in particular modal and temporal, logics, e.g., [8,21,22], since
labeling provides a clean and effective way of dealing with modalities and gives
rise to deduction systems with good proof-theoretical properties. The basic idea
is that labels allow one to explicitly encode additional information, of a semantic
or proof-theoretical nature, that is otherwise implicit in the logic one wants to
capture. So, for instance, instead of a formula A, one can consider the labeled
formula b : A, which intuitively means that A holds at the time instant denoted
by b within the underlying Kripke semantics. One can also use labels to specify
how time instants are related, e.g., the relational formula bRc states that the
time instant c is accessible from b.
Considering labels that consist of a single time instant is not enough for ∇,
as the operator is explicitly designed to speak about a sequence of time instants
(namely, the ones constituting the history of the corresponding until, if indeed
∇ results from the translation of an U). We thus consider labels that are built
out of a sequence of time instants, so that we can write αb1b3 : ∇A to express,
intuitively, that A holds in the interval between time instants b1 and b3, which
together with the sub-sequence α constitute a sequence of time instants αb1b3.
1 This is in contrast to the unfolding (1). The decoupling of U that we achieve with
∇ is precisely what allows us to give well-behaved (in a sense made clearer below)
natural deduction rules.
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This allows us to give the natural deduction elimination rule
αb1b3 : ∇A b1 6 b2 b2 6 b3
αb1b2 : A
∇E
that says that if ∇A holds at time instant b3 at the end of the sequence αb1b3
and if b2 is in-between b1 and b3, as expressed by the relational formulas with
the accessibility relation 6, then we can conclude that A holds at b2.
Dually, we can introduce ∇A at time instant b3 at the end of the sequence
αb1b3 whenever from the assumptions b1 6 b2 and b2 6 b3 for a fresh b2 we can
infer αb1b2 : A, i.e.
2,:
[b1 6 b2] [b2 6 b3]....
αb1b2 : A
αb1b3 : ∇A
∇I
The adoption of time instant sequences for labels has thus allowed us to give
rules for ∇ that are well-behaved in the spirit of natural deduction [17]: there
is precisely one introduction and one elimination rule for ∇, as well as for the
other connectives and temporal operators (⊃, G, and X). This paves the way to
a proof-theoretical analysis of the resulting natural deduction systems, e.g., to
show proof normalization and other useful meta-theoretical analysis, which we
are tackling in current work.
Moreover, the rules ∇I and ∇E provide a clean-cut way of reasoning about
until, according to the translation (2), provided that we also give rules for F and
X. These operators have a local nature, in the sense that they speak not about
sequences of time instants but about single time instants. Still, we can easily
give natural deduction rules for them by generalizing the more standard “single-
time instant” rules (e.g., [1,2,12,16,21,22,23]) using our labeling with sequences
of time instants. As we will discuss in more detail below, if we collapse the
sequences of time instants to consider only the final time instant in the sequence
(or, equivalently, if we simply ignore all the instants in a sequence but the last),
then these rules reduce to the standard ones. For instance, for the always in
the future operator G (the dual of F) and X, with the corresponding successor
relation ⊳, we can give the elimination rules
αb1 : GA b1 6 b2
αb1b2 : A
GE
and
αb1 : XA b1 ⊳ b2
αb1b2 : A
XE
The rule GE says that if GA holds at time instant b1, which is the last in the
sequence αb1 and b2 is 6-accessible from b1 (i.e., b1 6 b2), then we can conclude
that A holds for the sequence αb1b2. The rule XE is justified similarly (via ⊳).
The corresponding introduction rules are given in Section 4, together with rules
for ⊥ and the connective ⊃, as well as a rule for induction on the underlying
linear ordering. As we will see, we also need rules expressing the properties of the
2 The side condition that b2 is fresh means that b2 is different from b1 and b3, and does
not occur in any assumption on which αb1b2 : A depends other than the discarded
assumptions b1 6 b2 and b2 6 b3.
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relations 6 and ⊳. Moreover, the fact that we consider sequences of time instants
as labels requires us to consider some structural rules to express properties of
such sequences (with respect to formulas).
This approach thus provides the basis for formalizing deduction systems for
temporal logics endowed with the until operator. For concreteness, we give here
a labeled natural deduction system for a linear-time logic endowed with the new
history operator ∇ and show that, via a proper translation, such a system is also
sound and complete with respect to the linear temporal logic LTL with until.
(We do not consider past explicitly here, but adding operators and rules for it
should be unproblematic, e.g., as in [23].)
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we briefly recall the syntax and semantics
of LTL, and an axiomatization for it. In Section 3, we define LTL∇, the logic
that is obtained from LTL by replacing U with the history ∇, and give a validity-
preserving translation, based on (2), from LTL into LTL∇. In Section 4, we give
a labeled natural deduction system N (LTL∇) that it is sound with respect to
the semantics of LTL∇. By focusing only on those derivations whose conclusion
and open assumptions correspond to the translation of LTL-formulas, we show
that N (LTL∇) can be used to capture reasoning in LTL and that it is in fact
sound and complete with respect to the semantics of LTL. In Section 5, we draw
conclusions and illustrate directions of current and future work. Full proofs are
given in the appendix.
2 The Linear Temporal Logic LTL
We recall the syntax and semantics of LTL and an axiomatization for it.
Definition 1. Given a set P of propositional symbols, the set of (well-formed)
LTL-formulas is defined by the grammar
A ::= p |⊥| A ⊃ A | GA | XA | AUA
where p ∈ P . The set of LTL-atomic formulas is P ∪ {⊥}. The complexity of
an LTL-formula is the number of occurrences of the connective ⊃ and of the
temporal operators G, X, and U.
The intuitive meaning of G, X, and U is the standard one: GA states that A
holds always in the future, XA states that A holds in the next time instant, and
AUB states that B holds at the current time instant or there is a time instant
w in the future such that B holds in w and A holds in all the time instants
between the current one and w. As usual, we can introduce abbreviations and
use, e.g., ¬, ∨ and ∧ for negation, disjunction, and conjunction, respectively:
¬A ≡ A ⊃⊥, A ∨ B ≡ ¬A ⊃ B, and A ∧ B ≡ ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B). We can also define
other temporal operators, e.g., FA ≡ ¬G¬A to express that A holds sometime
in the future. We write Λ to denote a set of LTL-formulas.
Definition 2. Let N = 〈N, s : N → N,≤〉 be the standard structure of natural
numbers, where s and ≤ are respectively the successor function and the total
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(reflexive) order relation. An LTL-model is a pair M = 〈N ,V〉 where V : N →
2P . Truth for an LTL-formula at a point n ∈ N in an LTL-model M = 〈N ,V〉
is the smallest relation |=
LTL
satisfying:
M, n |=
LTL
p iff p ∈ V(n)
M, n |=
LTL
A ⊃ B iff M, n |=
LTL
A implies M, n |=
LTL
B
M, n |=
LTL
GA iff M,m |=
LTL
A for all m ≥ n
M, n |=
LTL
XA iff M, n+ 1 |=
LTL
A
M, n |=
LTL
AUB iff there exists n′ ≥ n such that M, n′ |=
LTL
B
and M,m |=
LTL
A for all n ≤ m < n′
Note that M, n 2
LTL
⊥ for every M and n. By extension, we write:
M |=
LTL
A iff M, n |=
LTL
A for every natural number n
M |=
LTL
Λ iff M |=
LTL
A for all A ∈ Λ
Λ |=
LTL
A iff M |=
LTL
Λ implies M |=
LTL
A, for every LTL-model M
We now present a sound and complete Hilbert-style axiomatization, which
we call H(LTL), for LTL (see, e.g., [10]). H(LTL) consists of the axioms
(A1 ) Any tautology instance (A2 ) G(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (GA ⊃ GB)
(A3 ) (X¬A↔ ¬XA) (A4 ) X(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (XA ⊃ XB)
(A5 ) GA ⊃ A ∧ XGA (A6 ) G(A ⊃ XA) ⊃ (A ⊃ GA)
(A7 ) AUB ↔ (B ∨ (A ∧ X(AUB))) (A8 ) AUB ⊃ FB
where we denote with ↔ the double implication, and of the rules of inference
(MP) If A and A ⊃ B then B (NecX ) If A then XA (NecG ) If A then GA
The set of theorems of H(LTL) is the smallest set containing these axioms
and closed with respect to these rules of inference.
3 LTL∇: LTL with history
In this section, we give the linear temporal logic LTL∇, which is obtained from
LTL by replacing the operator U with a new unary temporal operator ∇, called
history. The definition of the semantics of LTL∇ requires a notion of truth given
with respect to sequences of time instants rather than just to time instants. We
will then provide a translation from the language of LTL into the language of
LTL∇ and show some properties of such a translation.
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3.1 Syntax and semantics
Definition 3. Given a set P of propositional symbols, the set of (well-formed)
LTL∇-formulas is defined by the grammar
A ::= p |⊥| A ⊃ A | GA | XA | ∇A
where p ∈ P . The set of LTL∇-atomic formulas is P ∪ {⊥}. The complexity of
an LTL∇-formula is the number of occurrences of the connective ⊃ and of the
temporal operators X, G, and ∇.
The intuitive meaning of the operators G and X is the same as for LTL,
while ∇A intuitively states that A holds at any instant of a particular time
interval (but here we see that we need sequences of time instants to formalize
the semantics of the history operator, as we anticipated in the introduction).
Again, we can define other connectives and operators as abbreviations, e.g., ¬,
∨, ∧, F and so on. We write Γ to denote a set of LTL∇-formulas.
To define a labeled deduction system for the logic LTL∇, we extend the
language with a set of labels and finite sequences of labels, and introduce the
notions of labeled formula and relational formula.
Definition 4. Let L be a set of labels. A finite non-empty sequence of labels
(namely, an element of L+) is called a sequence. If A is an LTL∇-formula and α
is a sequence, then α : A is a labeled (well-formed) formula (lwff for short). The
set of relational (well-formed) formulas (rwffs for short) is the set of expressions
of the form b 6 c or b ⊳ c, where b and c are labels.
In the rest of the paper, we will assume given a fixed denumerable set L of
labels and we will use b, c, d, . . . to denote labels, α, β, γ to denote finite sequences
of labels3 (e.g., bcd . . . or just b in the case of a sequence consisting of only one
time instant), ϕ to denote a generic formula (either labeled or relational) and
Φ to denote a set of generic formulas.
Definition 5. An observation sequence is a non-empty sequence σ = [n0, . . . ,
nk] of natural numbers. Truth for an LTL∇-formula at an observation sequence
σ in an LTL-model M = 〈N ,V〉 is the smallest relation |=
∇
satisfying:
M, [n0, . . . , nk] |=∇ p iff p ∈ V(nk)
M, [n0, . . . , nk] |=∇ A ⊃ B iff M, [n0, . . . , nk] |=∇ A implies
M, [n0, . . . , nk] |=∇ B
M, [n0, . . . , nk] |=∇ GA iff M, [n0, . . . , nk,m] |=∇ A for all m ≥ nk
M, [n0, . . . , nk] |=∇ XA iff M, [n0, . . . , nk, nk + 1] |=∇ A
M, [n0, . . . , nk−1, nk] |=∇ ∇A iff M, [n0, . . . , nk−1,m] |=∇ A
for all nk−1 ≤ m ≤ nk (if 0 < k)
3 With a slight abuse of notation, we will also use α, β, γ to denote possibly empty
subsequences and thus write αb1 . . . bk (for k ≥ 1) to denote a sequence where α may
be empty.
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M, [n0] |=∇ ∇A iff M, [n0] |=∇ A
By extension, we write:
M |=
∇
A iff M, σ |=
∇
A for every observation sequence σ
M |=
∇
Γ iff M |=
∇
A for all A ∈ Γ
Γ |=
∇
A iff M |=
∇
Γ implies M |=
∇
A, for every LTL-model M
Given an LTL-modelM, a structure is a pair S = 〈M, I〉 where I : L → N. Let
Σ be the set of observation sequences and I+ : L+ → Σ the extension of I to
sequences, i.e., I+(b0 . . . bn) = [I(b0), . . . , I(bn)]. Truth for a generic formula ϕ
in a structure S = 〈M, I〉 is the smallest relation |=
∇
satisfying:
M, I |=
∇
a 6 b iff I(a) ≤ I(b)
M, I |=
∇
a⊳ b iff I(b) = I(a) + 1
M, I |=
∇
α : A iff M, I+(α) |=
∇
A
Note that M, σ 2
∇
⊥ and M, I 2
∇
α : ⊥ for every M, σ and I.
Given a set Φ of generic formulas and a generic formula ϕ:
M, I |=
∇
Φ iff M, I |=
∇
ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Φ
Φ |=
∇
ϕ iff M, I |=
∇
Φ implies M, I |=
∇
ϕ for all M and I
3.2 A translation from LTL into LTL∇
LTL and LTL∇ are, obviously, related logics. In fact, below we will define a
validity-preserving translation (·)∗ from LTL into LTL∇. Then, in Lemma 1, we
will show that if an LTL∇-formula corresponds to the translation of some LTL-
formula, then it can be interpreted “locally”, i.e., its truth value with respect
to an observation sequence depends only on the last element of the sequence.
Finally, in Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, we will use this result to prove that the
translation preserves the validity of formulas. This property allows us to use the
deduction system for LTL∇, which will be presented in Section 4, for reasoning
on LTL too, as we will show in Section 4.2, when discussing soundness and
completeness of the system.
Definition 6. We define the translation (·)∗ from the language of LTL into the
language of LTL∇ inductively as follows:
(p)∗ = p , for p atomic
(GA)∗ = G (A)∗
(⊥)∗ = ⊥
(XA)∗ = X (A)∗
(A ⊃ B)∗ = (A)∗ ⊃ (B)∗
(AUB)∗ = (B)∗ ∨ (F (X (B)∗ ∧ ∇(A)∗ ))
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We extend (·)∗ to sets of formulas in the obvious way: Λ∗ = {B∗ | B ∈ Λ}.
Lemma 1. Let M be an LTL-model, [n1, . . . , nk] an observation sequence, and
A an LTL-formula. ThenM, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ A
∗ iffM, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ A
∗
for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr.
Corollary 1. Let M be an LTL-model, [n1, . . . , nk] an observation sequence,
and A an LTL-formula. Then M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ A
∗ iff M, [nk] |=∇ A
∗.
Lemma 2. Let M be an LTL-model, n a natural number, and A an LTL-
formula. Then M, n |=
LTL
A iff M, [n] |=
∇
A∗.
Theorem 1. Let Λ be a set of LTL-formulas, A an LTL-formula and Λ∗ =
{B∗ | B ∈ Λ}. Then Λ |=
LTL
A iff Λ∗ |=
∇
A∗ .
Proof. By Definition 2, Λ |=
LTL
A iff ∀M.M |=
LTL
Λ implies M |=
LTL
A iff
∀M. (∀B ∈ Λ. ∀n.M, n |=
LTL
B implies ∀n.M, n |=
LTL
A ) iff (by Lemma 2)
∀M. (∀B ∈ Λ. ∀n.M, [n] |=
∇
B∗ implies ∀n.M, [n] |=
∇
A∗ ) iff (by Lemma
1) ∀M. (∀B ∈ Λ. ∀σ.M, σ |=
∇
B∗ implies ∀σ.M, σ |=
∇
A∗ ) iff (by Definition
5) ∀M. (∀B ∈ Λ.M |=
∇
B∗ implies M |=
∇
A∗ ) iff ∀M. (M |=
∇
Λ∗ implies
M |=
∇
A∗ ) iff Λ∗ |=
∇
A∗.
4 N (LTL∇): a labeled natural deduction system for
LTL∇
In this section, we will first define a labeled natural deduction system N (LTL∇)
that is sound with respect to the semantics of LTL∇. Then, by considering
a restriction of the set of N (LTL∇)-derivations and by using the translation
(·)∗ and the related results, we will show that N (LTL∇) can be also used for
reasoning on LTL: we will prove soundness with respect to the semantics of LTL
and we will give a proof of weak completeness with respect to LTL, by exploiting
the Hilbert-style axiomatization H(LTL).
4.1 The rules of N (LTL∇)
The rules of N (LTL∇) are given in Figure 1. In N (LTL∇) we do not make
use of a proper relational labeling algebra (as, e.g., in [22]) that contains rules
that derive rwffs from other rwffs or even lwffs. Since we are mainly interested
in the derivation of logical formulas, we rather follow an approach that aims
at simplifying the system: we use rwffs only as assumptions for the derivation
of lwffs (as in Simpson’s system for intuitionistic modal logic [21]). Thus, in
N (LTL∇) there are no rules whose conclusion is an rwff.
The rules ⊃I and ⊃E are just the labeled version of the standard [17] natural
deduction rules for implication introduction and elimination, where the notion
of discharged/open assumption is also standard; e.g., [α : A] means that the
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[α1 : A ⊃⊥]
.
.
.
.
α2 :⊥
α1 : A
⊥E
[α : A]
.
.
.
.
α : B
α : A ⊃ B
⊃I
α : A ⊃ B α : A
α : B
⊃E
[b1 6 b2]
.
.
.
.
αb1b2 : A
αb1 : GA
GI
αb1 : GA b1 6 b2
αb1b2 : A
GE
[b1 ⊳ b2]
.
.
.
.
α : A
α : A
ser⊳
b1 ⊳ b2 b1 ⊳ b3 ϕ
[ϕ[b3/b2]]
.
.
.
.
α : A
α : A
lin⊳
[b1 ⊳ b2]
.
.
.
.
αb1b2 : A
αb1 : XA
XI
αb1 : XA b1 ⊳ b2
αb1b2 : A
XE
[b1 6 b1]
.
.
.
.
α : A
α : A
refl6
b1 6 b2 b2 6 b3
[b1 6 b3]
.
.
.
.
α : A
α : A
trans6
[b1 6 b2] [b2 6 b3]
.
.
.
.
αb1b2 : A
αb1b3 : ∇A
∇I
αb1b3 : ∇A b1 6 b2 b2 6 b3
αb1b2 : A
∇E
βb : Al
αb : Al
last
b1 6 b2 b2 6 b1 αb1 : A
αb2 : A
eq6
b1 6 b2 ϕ
[ϕ[b2/b1]]
.
.
.
.
α : A
[b1 ⊳ b
′] [b′ 6 b2]
.
.
.
.
α : A
α : A
split6
b1 ⊳ b2
[b1 6 b2]
.
.
.
.
α : A
α : A
base6
αb0 : A b0 6 b
[b0 6 bi] [bi ⊳ bj ] [αbi : A]
.
.
.
.
αbj : A
αb : A
ind
The rules have the following side conditions:
– In XI (GI), b2 is fresh, i.e., it is different from b1 and does not occur in any assumption on
which αb1b2 : A depends other than the discarded assumption b1 ⊳ b2 (b1 6 b2).
– In ∇I, b2 is fresh, i.e., it is different from b1 and b3, and does not occur in any assumption on
which αb1b2 : A depends other than the discarded assumptions b1 6 b2 and b2 6 b3.
– In last , the formula must be of the form Al, as defined in (3).
– In ser⊳, b2 is fresh, i.e., it is different from b and does not occur in any assumption on which
α : A depends other than the discarded assumption b1 ⊳ b2.
– In split6, b
′ is fresh, i.e., it is different from b1 and b2 and does not occur in any assumption
on which α : A depends other than the discarded assumptions b1 ⊳ b
′ and b′ 6 b2.
– In ind , bi and bj are fresh, i.e., they are different from each other and from b and b0, and do
not occur in any assumption on which αb0bj : A depends other than the discarded assumptions
of the rule.
Fig. 1. The rules of N (LTL∇)
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formula is discharged in ⊃I. The rule ⊥E is a labeled version of reductio ad
absurdum, where we do not constrain the time instant sequence (α2) in which
we derive a contradiction to be the same (α1) as in the assumption.
The rules for the introduction and the elimination of G and X share the same
structure since they both have a “universal” formulation. Consider, for instance,
G and the corresponding relation 6. The idea underlying the introduction rule
GI is that the meaning of αb1 : GA is given by the metalevel implication b1 6
b2 =⇒ αb1b2 : A for an arbitrary b2 6-accessible from b1 (where the arbitrariness
of b2 is ensured by the side-condition on the rule). As we remarked above, the
operators G and X have a local nature, in that when we write αb1 : GA (and
similarly for αb1 : XA) we are stating that GA holds at time instant b1, which
is the last in the sequence αb1. Hence, the elimination rule GE says that if b2 is
6-accessible from b1 (i.e., b1 6 b2), then we can conclude that A holds for the
sequence αb1b2. Similar observations hold for X and the corresponding relation
⊳.
The rule ser⊳ models the fact that every time instant has an immediate
successor, while the rule lin⊳ specifies that such a successor must be unique.
ser⊳ tells us that if assuming b1⊳ b2 we can derive α : A, then we can discharge
the assumption and conclude that indeed α : A. lin⊳ is slightly more complex:
assume that b1 had two different immediate successors b2 and b3 (which we know
cannot be) and assume that the generic formula ϕ holds; if by substituting b3
for b2 in ϕ we obtain α : A, then we can discharge the assumption and conclude
that indeed α : A.
Similarly, the rules refl6 and trans6 state the reflexivity and transitivity
of 6, while eq6 captures substitution of equals.
4 The rule split6 states that if
b1 6 b2, then either b1 = b2 or b1 < b2. The rule thus works in the style of a
disjunction elimination: if by assuming either of the two cases, we can derive a
formula α : A, then we can discharge the assumptions and conclude α : A. Since
we do not use = and < explicitly in our syntax, we express such relations in an
indirect way: the equality of b1 and b2 is expressed by replacing one with the
other in a generic formula ϕ, < by the composition of ⊳ and 6.
The rule base6 expresses the fact that6 contains⊳, while the rule ind models
the induction principle underlying the relation between ⊳ and 6. If (base case)
A holds in αb0 and if (inductive step) by assuming that A holds in αbi for an
arbitrary bi 6-accessible from b0, we can derive that A holds also in αbj , where
bj is the immediate successor of bi, then we can conclude that A holds in every
αb such that b is 6-accessible from b0.
5
Finally, we have three rules that speak about the history and the label se-
quences: the rules ∇I and ∇E, which we already described in the introduction,
4 Recall that in this paper we use rwffs only as assumptions for the derivation of lwffs,
so we do not need a more general rule that concludes ϕ[b2/b1] from ϕ, b1 6 b2 and
b2 6 b1.
5 The rule is given only in terms of relations between labels, since we restrict the
treatment of operators in the system to the specific rules for their introduction and
elimination.
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and last . This rule expresses what we also anticipated in the introduction: the
standard operators (and connectives) of LTL speak not about sequences of time
instants but about single time instants, and thus if a formula A whose outer-
most operator is not ∇ holds at βb, then we can safely replace β by any other
sequence α and conclude that A holds at αb. To formalize this, we define the set
of (well-formed) LTLl-formulas (denoted by Al) by means of the grammar
Al ::= p |⊥| (Al) ⊃ (Al) | G(Al∇) | X(Al∇) (3)
Al∇ ::= Al | (Al∇) ⊃ (Al∇) | ∇(Al∇)
where p is a propositional symbol. Hence, in a formula Al, the history operator
∇ can only appear in the scope of a temporal operator G (and thus of F as in
the translation (2)) or X. The rule last applies to these formulas only; in fact,
the “l” in Al stands for “last”, but it also conveniently evokes both “local” and
“LTL”. For formulas ∇A whose outermost operator is the history operator ∇,
such a rule does not make sense (and in fact is not sound) as it would mean
changing the interval over which A holds.
Such considerations are formalized in the following lemma, where we prove,
for LTLl-formulas, a result that is the analogous of the one given in Lemma 1
with respect to the translation of LTL-formulas.6 At the same time, we also prove
that if A is a formula belonging to the syntactic category Al∇ of the grammar (3)
(we will call such formulas LTLl∇-formulas), then the truth value of A depends
on at most the last two elements of an observation sequence.
Lemma 3. LetM be an LTL-model, [n1, . . . , nk] an observation sequence, Al an
LTLl-formula and Al∇ an LTLl∇-formula. Then: (i) M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ A
l iff
M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ A
l for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr and (ii) M, [n1, . . . ,
nk−1, nk] |=∇ A
l∇ iff M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk−1, nk] |=∇ A
l∇ for every sequence
m1, . . . ,mr.
Given the rules in Fig. 1, the notions of derivation, assumption (open or
discharged, as we remarked) and conclusion are the standard ones for natural
deduction systems [17]. We write Φ ⊢
∇
α : A to say that there exists a derivation
of α : A in the systemN (LTL∇) whose open assumptions are all contained in the
set of formulas Φ. A derivation of α : A in N (LTL∇) where all the assumptions
are discharged is a proof of α : A in N (LTL∇) and we then say that α : A is a
theorem of N (LTL∇) and write ⊢∇ α : A.
To denote that Π is a derivation of α : A whose set of assumptions may
contain the formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, we write
ϕ1 . . . ϕn
Π
α : A
If we are interested in LTL-reasoning, then we can restrict our attention
to a subset of the N (LTL∇)-derivations, namely, to the derivations where the
conclusion and all the open assumptions correspond to the translations of LTL-
formulas.
6 In fact, Lemma 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 3 and of Lemma 4 below.
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Definition 7. Let Π be a derivation in N (LTL∇) and Φ the set containing the
conclusion and the open assumptions of Π . We say that Π is an LTL-derivation
iff there exists a label b such that for every ϕ in Φ there exists an LTL-formula
A such that ϕ = b : A∗. We write Λ ⊢
LTL
A to denote that in N (LTL∇) there
exists an LTL-derivation of b : A∗ from open assumptions in a set Φ, where
Λ = {B | b : B∗ ∈ Φ}.
In Definition 7, we require all the open assumptions and the conclusion of
an LTL-derivation to be lwffs labeled by the same single label b. Note that, as a
consequence of Corollary 1, we would obtain the same notion of LTL-derivation
by requiring instead that such formulas were labeled by the same sequence α.
In Section 4.2, we will show that N (LTL∇) is sound with respect to the se-
mantics of LTL∇ and, by considering the notion of LTL-derivability ⊢LTL , that it
is sound and weakly complete with respect to LTL. An investigation of complete-
ness with respect to LTL∇ is left for future work, together with the formalization
of an axiomatization of LTL∇.
Related to this, it is important to understand what exactly is the relationship
of the class of LTLl-formulas and the class of LTL-formulas, in particular with
respect to the translation (·)∗. It is not difficult to see that the co-domain of the
translation is included in LTLl by construction of (·)∗, i.e., by induction on the
formula complexity it follows that:
Lemma 4. If A is an LTL-formula, then A∗ is an LTLl-formula.
The other direction is trickier, as it basically amounts to defining an inverse
translation. To solve this problem, we have been considering normal forms of
LTLl-formulas and we conjecture that the following fact indeed holds.
Conjecture 1. If A is an LTLl-formula, then there exists an LTL-formula B such
that B∗ is semantically equivalent to A.
4.2 Soundness and completeness
Theorem 2. For every set Φ of labeled and relational formulas and every labeled
formula α : A, if Φ ⊢
∇
α : A, then Φ |=
∇
α : A.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the derivation of
α : A. The base case is when α : A ∈ Φ and is trivial. There is one step case for
every rule and we show here only the two representative cases
[b1 6 b2] [b2 6 b3]
Π
βb1b2 : B
βb1b3 : ∇B
∇I
and
Π
β′b : A
βb : A
last
Some more cases are in Appendix A.3. First, consider the case in which the
last rule application is a ∇I, where α = βb1b3, A = ∇B, and Π is a proof
of βb1b2 : B from hypotheses in Φ
′, with b2 fresh and with Φ
′ = Φ ∪ {b1 6
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b2} ∪ {b2 6 b3}. By the induction hypothesis, for every interpretation I, if
M, I |=
∇
Φ′, thenM, I |=
∇
βb1b2 : B. We let I be any interpretation such that
M, I |=
∇
Φ, and show that M, I |=
∇
βb1b3 : ∇B. Let I(b1) = n, I(b3) = m
and I+(β) = [n1, . . . , nk]. Since b2 is fresh, we can extend I to an interpretation
(still called I for simplicity) such that I(b2) = n+ i for an arbitrary 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
The induction hypothesis yields M, I |=
∇
βb1b2 : B, i.e., M, [n1, . . . , nk, n, n+
i] |=
∇
B, and thus, since i is an arbitrary point between 0 and m, we obtain
M, [n1, . . . , nk, n, n+m] |=∇ ∇B. It follows M, I |=∇ βb1b3 : ∇B.
Now consider the case in which the last rule applied is last and α = βb,
where Π is a proof of β′b : A from hypotheses in Φ. By applying the induc-
tion hypothesis on Π , we have Φ |=
∇
β′b : A. We proceed by considering a
generic LTL-modelM and a generic interpretation I on it such thatM, I |=
∇
Φ
and showing that this entails M, I |=
∇
βb : A. By the induction hypothesis,
M, I |=
∇
β′b : A, i.e., M, I+(β′b) |=
∇
A by Definition 5. Since A is an LTLl-
formula by the side condition of the rule and the two observation sequences
I+(β′b) and I+(βb) share the same last element I(b), we can apply Lemma 3
and obtain M, I+(βb) |=
∇
A, i.e., M, I |=
∇
βb : A by Definition 5.
By exploiting the translation of Section 3.2 and the notion of LTL-derivation
of Definition 7, we also prove a result of soundness with respect to LTL.
Theorem 3. For every set Λ of LTL-formulas and every LTL-formula A, if
Λ ⊢
LTL
A, then Λ |=
LTL
A.
Proof. By definition of ⊢
LTL
, for a given label b, there exists a derivation in
N (LTL∇) of b : A∗ from open assumptions in Φ = {b : B∗ | B ∈ Λ}. By
Theorem 2, Φ ⊢
∇
b : A∗ implies Φ |=
∇
b : A∗. Since b is generic, we have that for
every LTL-model M and every interpretation I, M, I |=
∇
Φ implies M, I |=
∇
b : A∗ iff for every natural number n, M, [n] |=
∇
Λ∗ implies M, [n] |=
∇
A∗,
where Λ∗ = {B∗ | B ∈ Λ}. By Lemma 1, we infer that for every observation
sequence σ, M, σ |=
∇
Λ∗ implies M, σ |=
∇
A∗. By Definition 5, Λ∗ |=
∇
A∗ and
thus, by Theorem 1, we conclude Λ |=
LTL
A.
As we anticipated, an analysis of the completeness of N (LTL∇) with respect
to LTL∇ is left for future work. Here we discuss completeness with respect to
LTL. The proposed natural deduction system consists of only finitary rules;
consequently, it cannot be strongly complete for LTL.7 Nevertheless, by using
the axiomatization H(LTL) and the translation (·)∗, we can give a proof of weak
completeness for it; namely:
Theorem 4. For every LTL-formula A, if |=
LTL
A, then ⊢
LTL
A.
Proof. We can prove the theorem by showing that N (LTL∇) is complete with
respect to the axiomatization H(LTL) given in Section 2, which is sound and
7 This is not a problem of our formulation: all the finitary deduction systems for
temporal logics equipped with at least the operators X and G have such a defect;
see, e.g., [15, Ch. 6].
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complete for the logic LTL. That is, we need to prove that: (i) the translation,
via (·)∗, of every axiom of H(LTL) is provable in N (LTL∇) by means of an LTL-
derivation, and (ii) the notion of ⊢
LTL
is closed under the (labeled equivalent of
the) rules of inference of H(LTL). Showing (ii) is straightforward and we omit it
here. As an example for (i), we give here a derivation of the translation of (A6).
The other cases are presented in Appendix A.4.
[b : A]2 [b 6 c]3
[b : G(A ⊃ XA)]1 [b 6 bi]
4
bbi : A ⊃ XA
GE
[bi : A]
4
bbi : A
last
bbi : XA
⊃E
[bi ⊳ bj ]
4
bbibj : A
XE
bj : A
last
c : A
ind4
bc : A
last
b : GA
⊃
3
b : A ⊃ GA
⊃I2
b : G(A ⊃ XA) ⊃ (A ⊃ GA)
⊃I1
5 Conclusions
The introduction of the operator ∇ has allowed us to formalize the “history”
of until and thus, via a proper translation, to give a labeled natural deduction
system for a linear time logic endowed with ∇ that is also sound and complete
with respect to LTL with until. As we remarked above, we see this work as
spawning several different directions for future research. First, the “recipe” for
dealing with until that we gave here is abstract and general, and thus provides
the basis for formalizing deduction systems for temporal logics endowed with
U, both linear and branching time. We are currently considering CTL∗ and its
sublogics as in [16,18] and are also working at a formal characterization of the
class of logics that can be captured with our approach.
Second, the well-behaved nature of our approach, where each connective and
operator has one introduction and one elimination rule, paves the way to a proof-
theoretical analysis of the resulting natural deduction systems, e.g., to show proof
normalization and other useful meta-theoretical properties, which we are tackling
in current work. Moreover, we are also considering different optimizations of the
rules. In particular, along the lines of the discussion about the rule last (and
Corollary 1 and Definition 7), we are investigating to what extent we can use
sequences as labels only when they are really needed, which would also simplify
the proofs of normalization and other meta-properties8.
8 As an interesting side-track, we believe that the restrictions we imposed on formulas
for the rule last , i.e., considering Al and Al∇, is closely related, at least in spirit, to the
focus on persistent formulas when combining intuitionistic and classical logic so as
to avoid the collapse of the two logics into one, see [6] but also [4,9]. We are, after all,
considering here formulas stemming from two classes (if not two logics altogether),
and it makes thus sense that they require different labeling (single instants and
sequences).
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This is closely related to the formalization of the relationship between the
class of LTLl-formulas and that of LTL-formulas, which in turn will allow us
to reason about the completeness of N (LTL∇) with respect to the semantics
of LTL∇ and also to provide an axiomatization of LTL∇ (thus treating it as a
full-fledged logic as opposed to as a “service” logic for LTL as we did here).
Finally, it is worth observing that several works have considered interval tem-
poral logics, e.g., [3,5,11,14,19]. While these works consider intervals explicitly,
we have used them somehow implicitly here, as a means to formalize the dual
nature of until via the history ∇, and this is another reason why it is interest-
ing to reduce the use of label sequences as much as possible. A more detailed
comparison of our approach with these works is left for future work.
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A Proofs
A.1 Properties of the translation (·)∗
Proof of Lemma 1 By induction on the complexity of A. The base case is when
A = p or A =⊥ and is trivial. There is one inductive step case for each connective
and temporal operator.
A = B ⊃ C. Then the translation of A is A∗ = B∗ ⊃ C∗. By Definition 5,
we obtain M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ B
∗ ⊃ C∗ iff M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ B
∗ implies
M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ C
∗. By the induction hypothesis, we see that this holds
iff M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ B
∗ implies M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ C
∗ for ev-
ery sequence m1, . . . ,mr and thus, by Definition 5, iff for every sequence
m1, . . . ,mr, M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ B
∗ ⊃ C∗.
A = GB. Then A∗ = GB∗. By Definition 5, M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ GB
∗ iff ∀m ≥
nk.M, [n1, . . . , nk,m] |=∇ B
∗ iff (by the induction hypothesis) ∀m ≥ nk.M,
[m1, . . . ,mr, nk,m] |=∇ B
∗ for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr iff (by Definition
5) M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ GB
∗, for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr.
A = XB. This case is very similar to the previous one and we omit it.
A = BUC. Then A∗ = C∗ ∨ (F(XC∗ ∧ ∇B∗)). By Definition 5, we have M,
[n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ A
∗ iff (M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ C
∗ or M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇
F(XC∗ ∧ ∇B∗)) iff (M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ C
∗ or ∃m ≥ nk. (M, [n1, . . . , nk,m]
|=
∇
XC∗∧∇B∗)) iff (M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ C
∗ or ∃m ≥ nk. (M, [n1, . . . , nk,m]
|=
∇
XC∗ and M, [n1, . . . , nk,m] |=∇ ∇B
∗)) iff (M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ C
∗
or ∃m ≥ nk. (M, [n1, . . . , nk,m,m + 1] |=∇ C
∗ and ∀l. nk ≤ l ≤ m im-
plies M, [n1, . . . , nk, l] |=∇ B
∗)) iff (by the induction hypothesis) for ev-
ery sequence m1, . . . ,mr, we have (M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ C
∗ or ∃m ≥
nk. (M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk,m,m + 1] |=∇ C
∗ and ∀l. nk ≤ l ≤ m implies
M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk,m, l] |=∇ B
∗)) iff (by Definition 5) M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk]
|=
∇
C∗ ∨ (F(XC∗ ∧ ∇B∗)) for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr.
⊓⊔
Proof of Corollary 1 Immediate, by Lemma 1. ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 2 By induction on the complexity of A. The base case is when
A = p or A =⊥ and is trivial. As inductive step, we have a case for each
connective and temporal operator.
A = B ⊃ C. Then A∗ = B∗ ⊃ C∗. We haveM, n |=
LTL
B ⊃ C iff (by Definition
2) M, n |=
LTL
B implies M, n |=
LTL
C iff (by the induction hypothesis)
M, [n] |=
∇
B∗ implies M, [n] |=
∇
C∗ iff (by Definition 5) M, [n] |=
∇
B∗ ⊃
C∗.
A = GB. Then A∗ = GB∗. We have M, n |=
LTL
GB iff (by Definition 2) ∀m ≥
n.M,m |=
LTL
B iff (by the induction hypothesis) ∀m ≥ n.M, [m] |=
∇
B∗
iff (by Lemma 1) ∀m ≥ n.M, [n,m] |=
∇
B∗ iff (by Definition 5) M, [n] |=
∇
GB∗.
A = XB. This case is very similar to the previous one and we omit it.
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A = BUC. Then A∗ = C∗ ∨ (F(XC∗ ∧ ∇B∗)). We have M, n |=
LTL
A iff (by
Definition 2) ∃m ≥ n.M,m |=
LTL
C and ∀n′. n ≤ n′ < m impliesM, n′ |=
LTL
B iff M, n |=
LTL
C or (∃m > n.M,m |=
LTL
C and ∀n′. n ≤ n′ < m implies
M, n′ |=
LTL
B) iff (by the induction hypothesis) M, [n] |=
∇
C∗ or (∃m >
n.M, [m] |=
∇
C∗ and ∀n′. n ≤ n′ < m implies M, [n′] |=
∇
B∗) iff (by
Lemma 1)M, [n] |=
∇
C∗ or (∃m > n.M, [n,m] |=
∇
C∗ and ∀n′. n ≤ n′ < m
implies M, [n, n′] |=
∇
B∗) iff M, [n] |=
∇
C∗ or (∃l ≥ n.M, [n, l, l + 1] |=
∇
C∗ and ∀n′. n ≤ n′ ≤ l implies M, [n, n′] |=
∇
B∗) iff (by Definition 5)
M, [n] |=
∇
C∗ or (∃l ≥ n. M, [n, l] |=
∇
XC∗ ∧ ∇B∗) iff (by Definition 5)
M, [n] |=
∇
C∗ ∨ F(XC∗ ∧ ∇B∗).
⊓⊔
A.2 The system N (LTL∇)
Proof of Lemma 3 The proofs of the statements (i) and (ii) proceed in par-
allel and are by induction on the formula complexity. The base case is when
Al = p or Al =⊥ and is trivial. There is one inductive step case for each other
formation case coming from the recursive definition of the grammar (3). Along
the proof, Al, Bl, Cl, . . . denote LTLl-formulas while Al∇, Bl∇, Cl∇, . . . denote
LTLl∇-formulas.
Al = Bl ⊃ Cl. By Definition 5, we haveM, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ B
l ⊃ Cl iff M, [n1,
. . . , nk] |=∇ B
l implies M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ C
l. By the induction hypothesis,
we see that this holds iff M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ B
l implies M, [m1, . . . ,
mr, nk] |=∇ C
l for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr and thus, by Definition 5, iff
for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr, M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ B
l ⊃ Cl .
Al = GBl∇. M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ GB
l∇ iff (by Definition 5) ∀m ≥ nk.M,
[n1, . . . , nk,m] |=∇ B
l∇ iff (by the induction hypothesis) ∀m ≥ nk.M,
[m1, . . . ,mr, nk,m] |=∇ B
l∇ for every sequencem1, . . . ,mr iff (by Definition
5) M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk] |=∇ GB
l∇ for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr.
Al = XBl∇. This case is very similar to the previous one and we omit it.
Al∇ = Bl. M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ B
l iff (by the induction hypothesis) M, [i1, . . . ,
is, nk] |=∇ B
l for every sequence i1 . . . , is and thus also M, [m1, . . . ,
mr, nk−1, nk] |=∇ B
l for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr.
Al∇ = Bl∇ ⊃ Cl∇. M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ B
l∇ ⊃ Cl∇ iff (by Definition 5) M, [n1,
. . . , nk] |=∇ B
l∇ implies M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ C
l∇. By the induction hy-
pothesis, this holds iff M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk−1, nk] |=∇ B
l∇ implies M, [m1,
. . . , mr, nk−1, nk] |=∇ C
l∇ for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr and thus, by
Definition 5, iff for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr, M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk−1, nk]
|=
∇
Bl∇ ⊃ Cl∇ .
Al∇ = ∇Bl∇. M, [n1, . . . , nk] |=∇ ∇B
l∇ iff (by Definition 5) ∀n. nk−1 ≤ n ≤
nk implies M, [n1, . . . , nk−1, n] |=∇ B
l∇ iff (by the induction hypothesis)
∀n. nk−1 ≤ n ≤ nk implies M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk−1, n] |=∇ B
l∇ for every
sequence m1, . . . ,mr iff (by Definition 5) M, [m1, . . . ,mr, nk−1, nk] |=∇
∇Bl∇ for every sequence m1, . . . ,mr.
⊓⊔
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A.3 Soundness
Proof of Theorem 2 We present here some more cases related to the proof of
Theorem 2, which states the soundness of the system N (LTL∇) with respect to
the semantics of LTL∇.
Consider the case in which the last rule application is a GI, where α = βb1
and A = GB:
[b1 6 b2]
Π
βb1b2 : B
βb1 : GB
GI
where Π is a proof of βb1 : GB from hypotheses in Φ
′, with b2 fresh and with
Φ′ = Φ ∪ {b1 6 b2}. By the induction hypothesis, for all interpretations I, if
M, I |=
∇
Φ′, thenM, I |=
∇
βb1b2 : B. We let I be any interpretation such that
M, I |=
∇
Φ, and show that M, I |=
∇
βb1 : GB. Let I(b1) = n and I+(β) =
[n1, . . . , nk]. Since b2 is fresh, we can extend I to an interpretation (still called
I for simplicity) such that I(b2) = n+m for an arbitrary m > 0. The induction
hypothesis yields M, I |=
∇
βb1b2 : B, i.e., M, [n1, . . . , nk, n, n + m] |=∇ B,
and thus, since m is arbitrary, we obtain M, [n1, . . . , nk, n] |=∇ GB. It follows
M, I |=
∇
βb1 : GB.
Now consider the case in which the last rule applied is GE and α = βb1b2:
Π
βb1 : GA b1 6 b2
βb1b2 : A
GE
where Π is a proof of βb1 : GA from hypotheses in Φ1, with Φ = Φ1 ∪ {b1 6 b2}
for some set Φ1 of formulas. By applying the induction hypothesis on Π , we
have:
Φ1 |=∇ βb1 : GA .
We proceed by considering a generic LTL-modelM and a generic interpretation
I on it such that M, I |=
∇
Φ and showing that this entails
M, I |=
∇
βb1b2 : A .
Since Φ1 ⊂ Φ, we deduce M, I |=∇ Φ1 and, from the induction hypothesis,
M, I |=
∇
βb1 : GA. Furthermore M, I |=∇ Φ entails M, I |=∇ b1 6 b2. Then,
by Definition 5, we obtain M, I |=
∇
βb1b2 : A.
Now consider the case in which the last rule applied is ∇E and α = βb1b2:
Π
βb1b3 : ∇A b1 6 b2 b2 6 b3
βb1b2 : A
∇E
where Π is a proof of βb1b3 : ∇A from hypotheses in Φ1, with Φ = Φ1 ∪ {b1 6
b2}∪{b2 6 b3} for some set Φ1 of formulas. By applying the induction hypothesis
on Π , we have:
Φ1 |=∇ βb1b3 : ∇A .
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We proceed by considering a generic LTL-modelM and a generic interpretation
I on it such that M, I |=
∇
Φ and showing that this entails
M, I |=
∇
βb1b2 : A .
Since Φ1 ⊂ Φ, we deduce M, I |=∇ Φ1 and, from the induction hypothesis,
M, I |=
∇
βb1b3 : ∇A. Furthermore M, I |=∇ Φ entails M, I |=∇ b1 6 b2 and
M, I |=
∇
b2 6 b3. Then, by Definition 5, we obtain M, I |=∇ βb1b2 : A.
Finally, consider the case in which the last rule applied is ind and α = βb:
Π ′
βb0 : A b0 6 b
[b0 6 bi] [bi ⊳ bj ] [βbi : A]
Π
βbj : A
βb : A
ind
where Π is a proof of βbj : A from hypotheses in Φ2 and Π
′ is a proof of
βb0 : A from hypotheses in Φ1, with Φ = Φ1 ∪ {b0 6 b} and Φ2 = Φ1 ∪ {b0 6
bi} ∪ {bi ⊳ bj} ∪ {βbi : A} for some set Φ1 of formulas. The side-condition on
ind ensures that bi and bj are fresh in Π . Hence, by applying the induction
hypothesis on Π and Π ′, we have:
Φ2 |=∇ βbj : A and Φ1 |=∇ βb0 : A .
We proceed by considering a generic LTL-modelM and a generic interpretation
I on it such that M, I |=
∇
Φ and showing that this entails
M, I |=
∇
βb : A .
First, we note that Φ1 ⊂ Φ and therefore M, I |=∇ Φ implies M, I |=∇ Φ1 and,
by the induction hypothesis on Π ′, M, I |=
∇
βb0 : A. Now let I(b0) = n for
some natural number n. FromM, I |=
∇
Φ, we deduceM, I |=
∇
b0 6 b and thus
I(b) = n+ k for some k ∈ N. We show by induction on k that M, I |=
∇
βb : A.
As a base case, we have k = 0; it follows that I(b) = I(b0) and thus trivially that
M, I |=
∇
βb0 : A entails M, I |=∇ βb : A. Let us consider now the induction
step. Given a label bk−1 such that I(bk−1) = n+k−1, we show that the induction
hypothesis M, I |=
∇
βbk−1 : A entails the thesis M, I |=∇ βb : A. We can build
an interpretation I ′ that differs from I only in the points assigned to bi and
bj , namely, I ′ = I[bi 7→ n + k − 1][bj 7→ n + k]. It is easy to verify that the
interpretation I ′ is such that the following three conditions hold:
(i) M, I ′ |=
∇
βbi : A;
(ii) M, I ′ |=
∇
b0 6 bi;
(iii) M, I ′ |=
∇
bi ⊳ bj.
Furthermore, the side-condition on the rule ind ensures that I and I ′ agree on
all the labels occurring in Φ1, from which we can infer M, I ′ |=∇ Φ1. It follows
M, I ′ |=
∇
Φ2 and thus, by the induction hypothesis on Π , M, I ′ |=∇ βbj : A.
We conclude M, I ′ |=
∇
βb : A by observing that I ′(bj) = I(b). ⊓⊔
20
A.4 Completeness
Proof of Theorem 4 We present here the N (LTL∇)-derivations of the remaining
axioms of H(LTL). Note that, for simplicity, we use also some rules (i.e., FI, FE,
∨I, ∨E, ∧I and ∧E) concerning derived operators. They can be easily derived
from the set of rules in Figure 1.
(A2 )
[b : G(A ⊃ B)]1 [b 6 c]3
bc : A ⊃ B
GE
[b : GA]2 [b 6 c]3
bc : A
GE
bc : B
⊃E
b : GB
GI3
b : GA ⊃ GB
⊃I2
b : G(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (GA ⊃ GB)
⊃I1
(A3 ) (X¬A↔ ¬XA)
[b : X¬A]1 [b⊳ c]2
bc : ¬A
XE
[b : XA]3 [b⊳ c]2
bc : A
XE
bc :⊥
⊃E
b : ¬XA
⊥E3
b : ¬XA
ser2⊳
b : X¬A ⊃ ¬XA
⊃I1
[b : ¬XA]1
[b⊳ c]2 [b⊳ d]4 [bc : A]3
bd : A
lin⊳
b : XA
XI4
b :⊥
⊃E
bc : ¬A
⊃
3
b : X¬A
XI2
b : ¬XA ⊃ X¬A
⊃I1
(A4 ) This proof is similar to the one for (A2 ) and we thus omit it.
(A5 )
[b : GA]1 [b 6 b]2
bb : A
GE
b : A
last
b : A
refl26
[b ⊳ c]3
[b 6 c]5 [c 6 d]4
[b : GA]1 [b 6 d]6
bd : A
GE
bd : A
trans66
bd : A
base56
bcd : A
last
bc : GA
GI4
b : XGA
XI3
b : A ∧ XGA
∧I
b : GA ⊃ (A ∧ XGA)
⊃I1
(A7 ) Note that, for brevity, we give here a derivation of a, clearly equivalent,
simplified version of the translation of (A7 ). Namely, we consider F(XB∧∇A) ⊃
(A∧X(B∨F(XB∧∇A))) instead ofB∨F(XB∧∇A) ⊃ B∨(A∧X(B∨F(XB∧∇A))).
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Left-to-right direction:
[b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)]1
[bc : XB ∧ ∇A]2
bc : ∇A
∧E
[b 6 b]3 [b 6 c]2
bb : A
∇E
bb : A
refl36
b : A
last
Π1
b : X(B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A))
b : A ∧ X(B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A))
∧I
b : A ∧ X(B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A))
FE2
b : F(XB ∧ ∇A) ⊃ (A ∧ X(B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A)))
⊃I1
where Π1 is the following derivation:
[b 6 c]2 [b⊳ b′]4
[bc : XB ∧ ∇A]2
bc : XB
∧E
[c 6 b′]5
bcb′ : B
XE
bb′ : B
last
bb′ : B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A)
∨I
b⊳ b′ b⊳ b′′
Π2
bb′′ : B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A) [bb′ : B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A)]6
bb′ : B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A)
lin6⊳
bb′ : B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A)
split56
b : X(B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A))
XI4
and Π2 is the following derivation:
[bc : XB ∧ ∇A]2
bc : XB
∧E
[c⊳ c′]7
bcc′ : B
XE
bb′′cc′ : B
last
bb′′c : XB
XI7
[b⊳ b′′]5
[b 6 b′′]9 [b′′ 6 d]8
[bc : XB ∧ ∇A]2
bc : ∇A
∧E
[b 6 d]10 [d 6 c]8
bd : A
∇E
bd : A
trans106
bd : A
base96
bb′′d : A
last
bb′′c : ∇A
∇I8
bb′′c : XB ∧∇A
∧I
[b′′ 6 c]5
bb′′ : F(XB ∧∇A)
FI
bb′′ : B ∨ F(XB ∧∇A)
∨I
Right-to-left direction: in the following derivations, we denote with ϕ the
formula b : A ∧ X(B ∨ F(XB ∧∇A)).
[ϕ]1
b : X(B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A))
∧E
[b⊳ e]2
be : B ∨ F(XB ∧∇A)
XE
[be : B]3
Π1
b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)
[be : F(XB ∧ ∇A)]3
Π2
b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)
b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)
∨E3
b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)
ser2⊳
b : (A ∧ X(B ∨ F(XB ∧ ∇A))) ⊃ F(XB ∧∇A)
⊃I1
where Π1 is the following derivation:
[b⊳ e]2 [b⊳ f ]5 [be : B]3 [bf : B]6
bf : B
lin6⊳
bbf : B
last
bb : XB
XI5
[b 6 b′]7 [b′ 6 b]7
[ϕ]1
b : A
∧E
b′ : A
eq6
bb′ : A
last
bb : ∇A
∇I7
bb : XB ∧∇A
∧I
[b 6 b]4
b : F(XB ∧∇A)
FI
b : F(XB ∧∇A)
refl46
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Π2 is the following derivation:
[be : F(XB ∧ ∇A)]3
[b⊳ e]2
[b 6 e]9 [e 6 c]8
[bec : XB ∧ ∇A]8
bec : B
∧E
[c⊳ f ]11
becf : B
XE
bcf : B
last
bc : XB
XI11
Π3
bc : ∇A
bc : XB ∧ ∇A
∧I
[b 6 c]10
b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)
FI
b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)
trans106
b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)
base96
b : F(XB ∧∇A)
FE8
and Π3 is the following derivation:
[b 6 d]12
[ϕ]1
b : A
∧E
[d : A]13
bd : A
last
[b⊳ f ]13 [b⊳ e]2 [f 6 d]13
[bec : XB ∧ ∇A]8
bec : ∇A
∧E
[e 6 d]14 [d 6 c]12
bed : A
∇E
bed : A
lin14⊳
bd : A
last
bd : A
split136
bc : ∇A
∇I12
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Proof of the axiom (A8 )
[b : B ∨ (F(XB ∧ ∇A))]1
[b : B]2
bb : B
last
[b 6 b]3
b : FB
FI
b : FB
refl36
[b : F(XB ∧ ∇A)]2
[c⊳ d]5
[b 6 c]4 [c 6 d]6
[bc : XB ∧ ∇A]4
bc : XB
∧E
[c⊳ d]5
bcd : B
XE
bd : B
last
[b 6 d]7
b : FB
FI
b : FB
trans76
b : FB
base66
b : FB
ser5⊳
b : FB
FE4
b : FB
∨E2
b : B ∨ (F(XB ∧ ∇A)) ⊃ FB
⊃I1
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